






















XII. VISIT, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND 
DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL VESSELS AND 
AIRCRAFT 
A. VISIT AND SEARCH OF NEUTRAL VESSELS 
Visit and search forms what has long been regarded as an ancillary right 
of belligerents, and serves the purpose of enabling the latter to determine 
the character of merchant vessels, the nature of their employment, and any 
other facts that may bear upon their relation to the war. 1 Generally 
speaking, the traditional justification urged on behalf of the belligerent 
right to visit and search neutral merchantmen remains unchanged today. 
So long as neutral states are placed under no obligation to prevent their 
subjects from rendering certain forms of assistance to a belligerent they 
cannot complain if belligerents, in turn, make use of a procedure designed 
to prevent an enemy from receiving such assistance. 
At the same time, the unquestioned right.!of belligerents to check the 
activities of neutral merchantmen through visit and search does not indi-
cate with sufficient precision the scope of the measures belligerents may 
resort to in order to render their preventive efforts effective. It is only 
natural that belligerents have sought to interpret a right long accorded 
them by the customary law in a manner intended to achieve maximum 
effectiveness in preventing contraband carriage, blockade breach and the 
performance of unneutral services. Inevitably this has led to the bel-
ligerent plea that changed conditions necessitate alterations in a procedure 
that is no longer wholly applicable to these conditions. Equally natural, 
however, has been the reticence of neutrals to yield to novel procedures 
which-though perhaps justifiable from the viewpoint of the belligerent's 
1 See, generally, Law of Naval Warfare, Article 502.. Article 31 of the U.S. Naval War Code of 
1900 defined the traditional purpose of visit and search as follows: "The object of the visit or 
search of a vessel is: (1) to determine its nationality (2.) to ascertain whether contr~band of 
war is on board (3) to ascertain ·whether a breach of blockade is intended or has been committed 
(4) to ascertain whether the vessel is engaged in any capacity in the service of the enemy." 
The early history of visit and search is given detailed treatment in Jessup and Deak, Neutrality: 
Vol. I, The Origins, pp. 157 ff. A thorough survey of state practice through World War I ma:r 
be found in A. P. Higgins, "Le droit de visite et de capture dans laguerre maritime," Recueil 
Des Cours, II (192.6), pp. 7o-166. World War II developments are briefly traced by S. W. p. 
Rowson, op. cit., pp. 2.02. ff., and the British system is described at length by Medlicott, op. cit., 
pp. 70 ff. United States opinion and practice is reviewed in Hyde, op. cit., pp. 1958 ff., and 
U.S. NavalT:VarCollege, International Law Situations, I926, pp. 43-73. 
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interests-clearly result in granting belligerents a far greater n1easure of 
control over neutral commerce than the traditional rules pern1itted. In 
consequence, both World Wars have witnessed a continuing controversy 
betw'een neutrals and belligerents over the detailed interpretation and 
application of a right whose legitimacy-in principle-has long been 
sanctioned by internationallaw. 2 
The visit and search of neutral merchantmen may be exercised anywhere 
outside of neutral jurisdiction 3 by the warships and military aircraft of a 
belligerent. Although the legitimacy of visit and search by military 
aircraft, and even by submarines as well, occasionally has been questioned 
by '\vriters, it is clear that no valid objection can be posed to belligerent 
utilization of these instruments if they are otherwise used in conformity 
with the rules governing the conduct of surface warships. Controversy as 
to the use of aircraft and submarines in belligerent operations directed 
against neutral shipping has its real basis in the claim that the special 
characteristics of the latter may serve to justify departure from rules appli-
2 Here again, as in the case of neutral-belligerent controversies over contraband and blockade, 
the nature of the difficulty is readily apparent. The belligerent has maintained that the 
detailed interpretation and application of a right (i. e., to visit and search neutral merchant-
men) must be determined in the light of the general purpose the right is intended to serve (i.e., 
the prevention, through seizure, of contraband carriage, blockade breach). Hence if changed 
conditions-or at least what the belligerent alleges to be changed conditions-threaten to 
frustrate the effective exercise of an established right the detailed rules must be altered to meet 
these changed conditions, while still preserving the basic purpose. But the neutral has either 
denied the legitimacy of the plea of changed conditions or has disputed that the novel measures 
introduced by belligerents represent a reasonable interpretation of the essential purpose served 
by a right whose validity is not denied. In the light of earlier remarks it need hardly be stated 
that "in logic" there is no satisfactory way out of the situation, save by an examination of 
state practice and the possible efficacy of novel belligerent measures in altering traditional 
procedures. , 
3 In practice this has meant the territorial waters of neutral states, though it has earlier 
been observed that there is a discernible tendency on the part of neutral states to extend the 
prohibition against the belligerent commission of hostile acts-including visit and search-
to waters adjacent to the maritime territorial belt (see pp. 2.2.4-6). It may also be noted that 
the visit and search-as well as the seizure-of neutral merchantmen is permitted only during 
a period of belligerency, recognized as such by third states. The record of third states in deny-
ing this right either during a period of civil war (where the insurgents have not been yet ac-
corded the status of belligerents) or in a situation of "armed conflict" (where the parties in-
volved make no declaration of war and deny any intent to wage war) is reasonably consistent. 
Whether the right to visit and search-and seize-neutral merchantmen extends into the period 
following the conclusion of a general armistice, and prior to the formal termination of the war, 
is not entirely clear. Undoubtedly, as between the belligerents the exercise of the right of 
prize during this period may be regulated by the provisions of the armistice. But it is difficult 
to see how the latter agreement could affect in any way the rights and duties of neutrals. For 
an affirmative answer to this question, see Oppenheim-Lauterpacht (op. cit., pp. 848-9): 
" ... since an armistice does not bring war to an end, and since the exercise of the right of 
vis~tation is not an act of warfare, it may be exercised during the time of a partial or general 
armistice." It must be admitted, however, that actual practice in this regard is almost non-
existent. 
333 
cable to surface warships, a claim that is more properly dealt with in a 
later connection. 4 Here it is necessary merely to emphasize that the 
subjects of the right of visit and search must be strictly limited to craft 
formally commissioned in the armed forces of a belligerent, and thereby 
generally permitted to exercise belligerent rights at sea. 
The objects of the belligerent right of visit and search include all pri-
vately owned neutral vessels. It is equally settled that neutral warships, 
as well as other public vessels operating in the service of the neutral's 
armed forces, may not be made the objects of visit and search. Beyond 
this point, however, a measure of uncertainty prevails both as to the 
liability to visit and search of other publicly owned and operated neutral 
vessels and of privately owned neutral merchantmen sailing under convoy 
of neutral warships bearing the same nationality. 5 In either case, bel-
ligerent recognition of the neutral's claim to exemption from visit and 
search of necessity entails the latter's acceptance of full responsibility for 
insuring that the vessels so exempted will abstain from rendering any form 
of assistance to a belligerent. 
Prior to World War I attention had been directed principally to the status 
of privately owned neutral merchantmen sailing under convoy of neutral 
warships. Despite persistent opposition on the part of Great Britain the 
opinion and practice of most states during the nineteenth century was to 
accord exemption from visit and search to convoyed vessels provided ade-
quate assurance-based upon thorough examination-could be obtained 
from the commander of the convoy concerning the cargo carried by, and 
the innocent employment of, all vessels in the convoy. 6 This broad con-
sensus of the so-called neutral" right of convoy" was accorded recognition 
in Articles 61 and 62. of the unratified 1909 Declaration of London, and, at 
the time, received even the approval of Great Britain. 7 However, in the 
4 See pp. 35--2.4· Thus the absence of any provision in the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare 
governing the visit and search of merchant vessels by aircraft was not due to an inability to 
agree upon the right, as such, when applied to aircraft, but upon the specific rules that were to 
govern the exercise of this right (see p. 342.). In the case of submarines a similar distinction 
is relevant, though here Article 2.2. of the 1930 London Naval Treaty expressly regulated the 
matter by declaring that in their actions- with respect to merchant vessels submarines must 
conform to the rules applicable to surface vessels. 
5 A clear distinction must be drawn between sailing under neutral convoy and sailing under 
belligerent convoy. It has already been observed (see pp. 32.1) that acceptance of the protec-
tion of belligerent warships renders neutral vessels liable either to attack or to seizure and 
subsequent condemnation.-It would also appear that neutral merchantmen under convoy at 
warships of another neutral have not been considered exempt from visit and search. 
6 See E. Gordon, La Visite des Convoies Neutres (1935). 
7 Articles 61 and 62. of the Declaration of London read: 
"Neutral vessels under convoy of their national flag are exempt from search. The com-
mander of a convoy gives, in writing, at the request of the commander of a belligerent ship ·of 
war, all information as to the character of the vessels and their cargoes, which could be obtained 
by visit and search. 
If the commander of the belligerent ship of war has reason to suspect that the confidence 
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course of the 1914 war Great Britain reverted to her traditional position 
and insisted upon a right to exercise visit and search over neutral merchant 
vessels, even though the latter might be found sailing under convoy of war-
ships of their own nationality. At the same time the vast majority of 
states have continued to endorse the practice which grants exemption to 
this category of vessels. 8 
In practice, the question of neutral convoys has decreased in importance, 
since neutral states have manifested little desire in recent naval hostilities 
to convoy their merchant vessels. 9 Much more important is the status of 
publicly owned and operated neutral vessels engaged in ordinary commer-
cial activities. Liability of the latter to visit and search remains a matter 
that has yet to be clearly resolved by state practice, though it is true there 
of the commander of the convoy has been abused, he communicates his sust'icions to him. 
In such a case it is for the commander of the convoy alone to conduct an investigation. He 
must state the result of such investigation in a report, of which a copy is furnished to the officer 
of the ship of war. If, in the opinion of the· commander of the convoy, the facts thus stated 
justify the capture of one or more vessels, the protection of the convoy must be withdrawn from 
such vessels." 
Prior to the Declaration of London, Article 30 of the U. S. Naval War Code (1900) had 
provided that: "Convoys of neutral merchant vessels, under escort of vessels of war of their own 
State, are exempt from the right of search upon proper assurances, based on thorough examina-
tion, from the commander of the convoy." Later, the 1917 and 1941 Instructions substantially 
followed Articles 6r and 62. of the Declaration of London. And see Law of Naval Warfare, 
Article 502. as well as note 10 thereto. 
8 E. g., Article no of the 1934 French Naval Instructions, Articles 187 and 188 of the 1938 
Italian Laws of War and Article 34 of the 1939 German Prize Law Code.-If the commander 
of a belligerent warship is dissatisfied with the assurances given him by the commander of the 
neutral convoy the proper action is to report the incident to his government. The latter may 
then complain to the neutral state and press for proper redress at the diplomatic level. 
g There are only two or three instances of neutral convoy during World War I and apparently 
none at all in the 1939 war. See Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 2.o8-12.. See also Benjamin 
Akzin ("Neutral Convoys in Law and Practice," Michigan Law Review, 40 (1941), pp. r-2.3), 
who attributes this atrophy of neutral convoys to the all inclusive character of modern contra-
band lists and the belligerent creation of so-called "blockade" zones covering vast areas of the 
high seas. Thus, in the case of apparently innocent goods having a neutral destination, 
application of the principle of ultimate enemy destination would give rise to uncertainty and 
controversy unless the neutral state were prepared to guarantee that the cargoes being convoyed 
were intended only for neutral consumption. Even then, the problem of barred zones would 
remain. Neutral convoys have never been permitted to pass through blockaded areas, and 
belligerents might well insist that in the case of barred zones or war zones-particularly when 
established as a measure of reprisal-neutral vessels could not be accorded passage under any 
circumstances. To these considerations must be added the unwillingness of neutrals to assign 
a substantial portion of their naval strength to the task of convoying merchant vessels. In 
this connection, mention may be made of the convoys undertaken by United States naval forces 
in the Atlantic during the final months prior to this country's entrance into hostilities in 1941. 
By this time the United States had openly abandoned any attempt to observe the duties laid 
upon neutrals by the traditional law. The American merchant vessels under convoy carried 
war materials to Great Britain, and, on occasion, these convoys also included British merchant 
vessels. Whatever the justification that may otherwise be urged on behalf of this abandonment 
ofneutral duties (see pp. 167-8), it is clear that American policy during this period can have 
little relevance to the problem of neutral convoys in the sense indicate(above. 
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is a growing optnton that these vessels ought to be assimilated-at least 
for the purpose of visit and search-to the status of privately owned 
merchant vessels. 10 
I. The Traditional Procedure For Conducting Visit and Search 
Customary international law does not lay down detailed rules governing 
the mode of conducting visit and search and belligerents have always en-
joyed a certain discretion in this regard. In general, however, a sub-
stantial measure of unifortnity came to characterize the traditional practices 
of states, and this uniformity was reflected in the special instructions issued 
by maritime powers to their naval forces. Before calling upon a neutral 
merchantman to submit to visitation a belligerent warship is required to 
show its true colors. In addition, visitation must be preceded by a clear 
signal on the part of the warship that the merchant vessel is expected to 
stop and bring to. The notification of intention to visit may be accomp-
lished by any of several means, e. g., by firing a blank charge, by inter-
national flag signal, or even by radio. Nor does international law pre-
scribe the distance a belligerent warship must keep from the vessel being 
visited, vvhich may vary according to the conditions of the sea, the size 
and character of the visiting warship, and many other factors. 
H a neutral vessel complies with the summons the belligerent is for-
bidden to resort to forcible measures. However, if the neutral vessel takes 
to flight she 1nay be pursued and brought to, even though this may require 
the resort to measures of force. In addition, a neutral vessel that responds 
to a belligerent summons to lie to by measures of forcible resistance may be 
made the object of a degree of force necessary to compel the neutral vessel 
to submit to visit and search. 11 Acts of forcible resistance on the part of a 
neutral vessel, justifying the employment of force by a belligerent warship, 
IO See p. 2.14 and note 44 thereto. The uncertainty that presently prevails over the status 
of publicly owned merchant vessels engaged in ordinary commercial undertakings can hardly 
be regarded with anything but dissatisfaction. Nevertheless, there is very little that may 
usefully be said on this subject other than to stress that it does remain unsettled in state practice 
and offers but one further example of the growing obsolescence of the traditional law and the 
unwillingness of states to agree upon changes in that law. Nor is the experience of World 
War II of material assistance in this respect, since the clearest lesson to be drawn from that 
experience is the reticence of belligerent and neutral to bring the question to a head. In 
principle, the belligerent claim to visit and search neutral public vessels other than those 
making up a part of the neutral's armed forces is only reasonable, for it is difficult to see any 
other method whereby the former could be assured that the neutral state was not undertaking 
to supply an enemy with war materials. It is beyond this point that the more serious question 
arises and that state practice to date provides almost no real guidance. 
u A number of points arise in this connection which deserve at least cursory treatment. It 
is quite usual to encounter the opinion that although neutral vessels _may attempt to evade visit 
and search (and possible seizure) through flight they may not offer forcible resistance to a 
summoning warship. The ostensible reason for this is that since belligerents have a right to 
visit and search neutral vessels the latter have a dttty to submit to this procedure. On the other 
hand, a contrast is generally drawn between the position of neutral merchant vessels and of 
enemy merchant vessels. Since the latter are always liable to seizure and condemnation as 
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may take a variety of forms, e. g., the attempt to fire upon or to ran1 the 
summoning warship, the sending of position reports to ar:t enemy warship, 
or even the attempt to scuttle the neutral vessel in orderito~prevent seizure .12 
prize they may resist attempted visit and search (or seizure), though by doing so they incur 
the risk of being fired upon and possibly destroyed. But this manner of formulation may 
easily prove misleading. A merchant vessel (whether enemy or neutral) may be considered 
as having a dttty to submit to visit and search (or, possibly, seizure) if the attempt either to 
evade or to resist permits belligerents to take measures not otherwise permitted by law. These 
measures may then be regarded as sanctions, imposed as a consequence of attempted evasion 
or resistance. In the case of enemy merchant vessels resistance to seizure~permits the enemy 
to attack and even to destroy such vessels without insuring the prior safety of passengers and 
crew, a requirement otherwise demanded by the traditional law. In the case of neutral 
merchant vessels the attempt to evade visit and search may lead not only to such forcible 
measures as are necessary to require submission, but to seizure and even to confiscation of vessel 
and cargo. At least this is true of the practice of many states, including the United States. 
Forcible resistance on the part of neutral merchant vessels must always lead to the risk of 
destruction, and once seized to condemnation· of vessel and cargo. It has been contended by 
some writers that acts of forcible resistance to lawful visit and search may place the crew of a 
neutral merchant vessel in the position of franc-tireurs and allow a belligerent to treat them 
as war criminals. But there is little positive support in state practice for this opinion. In 
any event, it is clear that neutral merchant vessels neither have a right to evade nor a right 
to resist visit and search, though the sanctions attending the commission of these acts may vary. 
12 No question will arise with respect to the first of the examples cited above. It should be 
equally apparent that a neutral merchant vessel in sending position reports to enemy forces 
(on whose behalf it may be performing certain services) performs a serious act of resistance, 
entitling the summoning vessel to use any means at its disposal to stop. The last example-
that of scuttling a neutral vessel-is somewhat questionable, since although scuttling is clearly 
an attempt to prevent or frustrate visit and search it hardly seems to constitute "forcible re-
sistance" in the sense in which that term is normally used. It is of interest to note, however. 
that in a prize decision rendered during World War II the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone did 
decide that the attempted scuttling of a neutral (French) vessel constituted "forcible resistance" 
to visit and search, thereby justifying s.eizure and condemnation. The l11do-Chinois [1941], 
Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1941-42.), Case No. 173, pp. 594-8. 
Distinguish, though, between "forcible resistance" on the part of neutral merchant vesse]~ 
prior to visit and search and certain acts of resistance once the vessel has been brought to ancl 
visited (e. g., refusal to show papers or to unlock boxes). The latter may result in seizure and-
perhaps-in subsequent condemnation, though there is no justification for the belligerent tn 
resort to forcible measures. Finally, it is of importance to emphasize that a neutral vessel may 
not be considered as intending forcibly to resist visit and search simply for the reason that she 
is armed in order to defend herself against unlawful attacks on the part of a belligerent. Thea 
duty to submit to visit and search cannot be interpreted as forbidding the carrying of armr. 
for use against a belligerent that persists in attacking neutral vessels without warning and in 
disregard of the safety of lives of passengers and crew. In both World Wars the United States, 
while still a non-participant, placed naval armed guards on board American merchant ships, 
equipped them with guns and authorized the defensive use of armament against attack from 
German submarines. On both occasions, however, the arming of American merchant vessels 
came within a month of United States entrance into hostilities. This experience would appear 
to indicate that a belligerent intent upon waging unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare 
against both enemy and neutral shipping is not likely to be deterred by the neutral's policy 
of arming its merchant vessels. Still further, it seems clear that a neutral equally intent upon 
taking defensive measures against unlawful attacks made upon its merchant vessels will soon 
find itself an active participant in the hostilities. 
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Once a summoned vessel has been brought to the usual procedure is for the 
visiting warship to send a boat with an officer to conduct visit and search. 13 
In a formal sense visitation is limited to an examination of the ship's papers, 
and the evidence furnished by papers against a vessel has always been 
regarded as justifying her immediate seizure. 14 It may happen, however, 
that although a ship's papers are seemingly in order the visiting officer 
nevertheless remains dissatisfied with the innocence of the vessel. It has 
always been true that regularity of papers and evidence of innocence of 
cargo or of destination are not necessarily conclusive, and if doubt persists 
a visiting officer may question the master and crew members and conduct 
a search of the vessel and cargo. 15 If the result of search does not dispel 
suspicion, and the visiting officer considers that reasonable cause for seizure 
exists, he may seize the vessel and send her into port. On the other hand, 
if the result of search and the interrogation of crew members satisfies the 
visiting officer of the innocence of vessel and cargo, the vessel may be 
released and allowed to continue on her voyage. 
2. Visit and Search Today: The Consequences of Diverston 
Normally, the traditional procedure of visit and search, as briefly outlined 
above, resulted in a minimum degree of interference and delay . . The entire 
process-even if involving search-generally took no more than several 
hours. If the condition of the sea prevented visitation at the time of en-
counter the usual practice was for the belligerent warship to escort the 
neutral vessel to waters where visit was possible, and for this purpose bel-
ligerents could require a neutral vessel to undertake reasonable deviation 
from her normal course. Even so, deviation-however slight-was re-
garded as an unusual measure, justified only by exceptional circumstances. 
It is equally necessary to emphasize that the result of visit and search, 
according to the traditional law, was either to release the neutral vessel or 
to seize (capture) her as prize. A belligerent was thus confronted with two 
13 Though the traditional practice of some states has been to require the master of the mer-
chant vessel to bring his papers on board the visiting warship. Many writers still object to 
this practice of requiring a master to leave his ship. 
14 Thus if a ship's papers indicate carriage of contraband or the performance of any kind of 
unneutral service the vessel may at once be seized. Seizure is also justified if a vessel is found to 
be carrying double papers, or false papers-though instances involving such behavior are now 
rare. A clear deficiency of papers also may constitute sufficient cause for seizure, as well any 
attempt to spoil, deface, destroy, or conceal papers. 
15 In conducting search at sea the belligerent is obliged to prevent any damage to vessel or 
cargo. The master of the vessel is required to assist in the search and to open all holds, lockers 
and strongboxes. H he refuses to do so these spaces may not be forced open. But upon refusal 
to assist in the search the visiting officer is provided with sufficient cause for seizure of the 
vessel. It is also relevant to note that according to nineteenth century practice search consis'ted 
ordinarily in the "sampling" of the cargo and not in an intensive search of the entire cargo-
even if this were possible. Upon completion of search everything removed must be replaced, 
and the officer conducting the search should enter the time, date and place of ·the visit and 
search in the ship's log. 
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clear alternatives. If he elected to seize the vessel and take her into port 
the action had to be justified before the prize court, and in order to escape 
claims for costs and damages arising fro1n unlawful seizure the captor was 
obliged to show that the evidence found on board the seized vessel at the 
time of visit and search was of such a character as to furnish "probable 
cause" for capture. 16 
It was to this traditional procedure that the United States appealed as a 
neutral when it protested during World War I against the British practice 
of divertinb neutral vessels into port for search. 17 There can be little doubt 
that the position taken at that time by the American government was in 
substantial accord with the then recognized practice of states. 18 Neverthe-
less, there can be even less doubt that given the conditions characterizing 
that conflict belligerent efforts to prevent contraband carriage would have 
been rendered largely futile if the traditional rules governing visit and 
search (and seizure) had been rigidly follo\ved-a point Great Britain was 
not slow in 1naking. 19 
In large measure, however, the principal causes that led to diversion were 
obscured through the belligerent contention that search in port was rendered 
essential by the increased size of merchant ships, which made concealed 
contraband difficult to detect at sea, and by the danger of attack from enemy 
warships, particularly submarines. Undoubtedly these were contributing 
16 For further remarks on the "probable cause" justifying capture or seizure, see pp. 2.71-2, 
346 (n). Of course, condemnation before the prize court did not necessarily follow, but so long 
as a captor could show probable cause neutral claims to costs and damages were barred. Ob-
serve, also, that the traditional procedure required evidence justifying seizure to come from the 
vessel herself(' 'out of her own mouth'') and not from external sources. Although British prize 
law never followed this procedure as rigidly as did the-continental powers, it is not inaccurate 
to state that up to World War I the requirement was generally adhered to. 
17 Convenient texts of the detailed exchange of notes between Great Britain and the United 
States may be found in A.]. I. L., 9 (1915), Spec. Supp., pp. 55 ff. and 10 (1916), Spec. Supp., 
pp. 73 ff. and 12.1. A summary of this exchange is given in Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VII, 
pp. 182. ff. 
18 The American position was succinctly stated in a note of November 7, 1914, in which it 
was observed that: ". . . the belligerent right of visit and search requires that the search 
should be made on the high seas at the time of the visit and that the conclusion of the search 
should rest upon the evidence found on the ship, and not upon circumstances ascertained from 
external sources. That evidence, in the view of this Government, should make out a prima 
facie case to justify the captor in taking the vessel into port. To take vessels into custody and 
send them into a port of the belligerent without prima facie evidence to impress the cargo with 
the character of absolute or conditional contraband, constitutes, in the opinion of the United 
States, a justifiable ground for complaint by a neutral government, and a basis fqr a legal claim 
for damages against the belligerent government which has detained the vessel for the purpose 
of inquiry through other channels as to the ultimate destination of the cargo, or as to the 
intended action of the government of the neutral country of destination.'' 
19 This formed the essential feature of the British argument in support of diversion-that 
in no other way could the right of search be exercised effectively, and that if diversion were 
abandoned then search itself might just as well be abandoned. 
399334-57--23 339 
factors in prompting the belligerents to the practice of diversion. But the 
substantial and compelling reason for diversion was that little or no evi-
dence to support a case for seizure--let alone for later condemnation-could · 
be worked up by restricting attention to the ship's papers and to the nature 
of the cargo carried. In the vast majority of instances where vessels were 
encountered bound for a neutral port, and carrying cargo to be delivered to 
a neutral consignee, the ship'.s papers themselves furnished no real assurance 
of the ultimate destination of the cargo. Instead, the evidence necessary 
to justify seizure normally could come only from external sources. Not in-
frequently, this information was collected prior to the act of visit. More 
often, however, it could be gathered only after a vessel had been diverted 
to a belligerent contraband control base. 20 
In view of the experience of the two World Wars it does not appear very 
realistic to continue to question the legitimacy-in principle-of diverting 
neutral merchant vessels into port for search.21 Indeed, by the time of the 
1939 war nearly all the major naval powers recognized diversion as a lawful 
measure, at least where there was reason for -believing 22 that a neutral 
vessel might be found liable to seizure, and if search at sea was considered 
either impossible or impracticable.23 
The real difficulty, however, has been that of determining the limits to 
what may presently be regarded as the belligerent right of diversion. In 
theory, it is easy enough to insist that diversion must not be undertaken 
indiscriminately, in the hope that once a neutral vessel is in port further 
evidence of contraband carriage-or other unlawful acts-may be found 
20 In part, the passages in the text above form a restatement of observations made earlier in 
connection with the problem of establishing enemy destination in the case of contraband (see 
pp. 2.70 ff.). It can hardly be stressed too strongly that acceptance of the principle of ultimate 
enemy destination is at the root of the practice of diversion. Indeed, to insist upon rigid observ-
ance of the traditional procedure of visit and search, and the confining of evidence necessary 
to justify seizure to the vessel herself, would clearly have the effect of reducing the principle ' 
of ultimate enemy destination to a shadow, altogether devoid of real substance. 
21 Though, of course, it is quite possible to question the legitimacy of many of the specific 
measures resorted to by belligerents under the pretext of rendering diversion effective. But for 
a continued denial of the lawfulness of diversion, see Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and 
Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 578-6or. AlsoP. C. Jessup, "The 
Diversion of Merchantmen," A.]. I. L., 34 (1940), pp. 312.-5. And see the noncommital posi-
tion of Hyde, op. cit., pp. 1965-70. The majority of writers, however, now concede ·a belligerent 
right of diversion-at least in principle. 
22 Whether through evidence obtained as a result of visitation or obtained from external 
sources prior to visit. 
23 Thus-in addition to Great Britain-Articles 107-109 of the_ 1934 French Naval Instruc-
tions, Articles 6o-63 of the 1939 German Prize Law Code, Article 182. of the 1938 Italian War 
Regulations and Article 12.0 of the Japanese Naval War Law (1942.). Although the 1917 Instruc-
tions issued to United States naval forces made no allowance for diversion, the 1941 Instructions 
declared in paragraph 52., that "if for any reason ... search at sea is impracticable," the vessel 
may be escorted by the summoning vessel or by another vessel to the nearest port where search 
may conveniently be made." Finally, see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 5o2.b (5). 
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and a case for seizure worked up that would satisfy a prize court. 24 In 
practice, this is very nearly the precise result to which diversion has led. 
Nor is this development-so clearly apparent during World War II 25-any 
cause for surprise in view of the more profound causes that prompted 
belligerents to resort to diversion in the first place. In addition, it must 
probably be admitted that once diversion into port is granted it may be 
exercised in circumstances which justified search at sea according to 
the traditional law. But according to the traditional law the circumstances 
justifying search at sea-not to be confused with the circumstances justi-
fying capture 26-could be very slight. On this basis, the same slight 
reasons may serve to justify diversion into port for search. And if this is 
true then the difference between the indiscriminate diversion of merchant 
vessels and diversion in circumstances (usually derived from external 
sources) held to create sufficient reason to justify search is surely one 
bordering on sophistry. 27 
24 Even the majority of British. writers-who have never looked askance at the practice of 
diversion-continue to insist upon this limitation as retaining at least a formal validity. In 
1927 the Naval War College concluded, after an extensive review of the problem, that diversion 
into port "presupposes a suspicion of liability to prize proceedings based on information in 
possession of the visiting vessel at the time. Suspicion that all vessels may be found liable is 
not sufficient ground for indiscriminately sending in of merchant vessels.'' Imernational Law 
Situations, r927, p. 71. But see the further remarks in the text above. 
25 The British system has been extensively reviewed by Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 7o-1o5. At 
the outbreak of hos.:ilities in September 1939, neutral vessels carrying goods to neutral ports 
adjacent to Germany were invited to call voluntarily at British contraband control bases for 
examination. Vessels attempting to avoid calling at these bases were liable to be compelled 
by naval patrols to undergo diversion. Within a very short time, as Medlicott notes, "all ships 
bound for adjacent neutral countries were sent in unless they had a naval clearance" (p. 71) . 
Once in port the vast intelligence facilities at the disposal of the Ministry of Economic Warfare 
would go into operation, and a decision would be reached either to release the vessel and cargo 
or to seize the cargo-and perhaps the vessel as well-as prize. In November and December of 
1939 the United Stares protested this forcible diversion of American vessels, particularly in 
view of the fact that contraband control bases were within "combat areas" defined by the 
President and into which American vessels were forbidden to sail by lhe Neutrality Act of 1939. 
However, the right of a belligerent to compel diversion in circumstances justifying suspicion 
was never clearly challenged. Instead, it was alleged that since American vessels were for-
bidden to sail within "combat areas" no reasonable suspicion of contraband carriage could 
arise thereby necessitating their diversion. Obviously this argument could easily be challenged, 
and was so challenged, on the ground that the cargoes carried to neutral ports might ultimately 
find their way to enemy territory. The real criticism that could be made of the British system 
of diversion-and which many neutrals did make during the early months of the war-was 
that it was obviously indiscriminate in character. 
26 Seep. 346 (n). As a matter of fact the circumstances now held to justify seizure are them-
selves very slight. 
27 From the point of view of a strict legal analysis the considerations adduced above would 
appear very difficult to deny-once the bare right of diversion is conceded. And it is for these 
reasons that the scope of the belligerent right of diversion has proven so difficult to define. 
It is an interesting fact that in British prize law the question of diversion-as such-has never 
been· adequately reviewed. In The Zamora [r9r6], the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
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Furthermore, once the right of diversion into port is granted the tra-
ditional procedure of visitation threatens to become little more than a 
formality devoid of any real meaning. Exceptionally, a formal visit rna y 
yet serve the purpose of bringing to light facts heretofore unknown to the 
visiting belligerent. Normally, however, the visiting belligerent will 
already possess that information he may obtain from an examination of the 
ship's papers, and he may even possess a good deal more. If so, he will 
gain nothing from visit, and if there is the slightest reason for believing 
that any of the vessel's cargo is ultimately destined to enemy territory he 
will almost certainly order her into port. 28 Under these circumstances 
continued insistence upon visitation prior to diversion can only serve the 
purpose of denying to aircraft the right to order the diversion of merchant 
vessels, owing to an inability to conduct visit. It is difficult to see the 
logic of this position, since the insuring of proper identification-without 
formal visit-and the communication of instructions to the master of a 
vessel can as readily be carried out by aircraft as by warships. In permit-
ting military aircraft to order the diversion of merchant vessels, without 
undertaking prior visit, belligerents will not be conceded subs tan tiall y 
greater control over neutral shipping than that which they already claim 
(and neutrals seem no longer seriously disposed to resist) on behalf of 
surface warships. 29 
merely held diversion to be a justifiable practice "because search at sea is impossible under 
the conditions of modern warfare," 4 Lloyds Prize Cases, p. uo. In The Bernisse and The Elve 
[r92o]-(9 Lloyds Prize Cases, pp. 243 ff.), the Privy Council expressly refrained from reviewing 
the scope of the belligerent right of diversion, though the decision did make clear that under 
certain circumstances diversion could be held by the Prize Court as unjustified, and thereby 
giving rise to a liability of the Crown for costs and damages sustained by neutral claimants. 
More recently, in The Mim [1947] (Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases 
(1947), Case. No. 134, pp. 3u-6), the British Prize Court held that "in the absence of reasonable 
suspicion the ship must be allowed to proceed. If she is detained, for example, by mistake ... 
or if she is detained for some ulterior reason unconnected with search, the Crown cannot rely , 
on the belligerent right of visit and search as an answer to the plaintiff's claim." At the same 
time, the clear implication of the decision in The Mim was not only thar: diversion could be 
ordered for the same reasons as would justify search at sea, but that very little reason was 
required to justify search. The same point was made by the Privy Council in The Bernisse. 
28 But writers remain-on the whole-reluctant to admit that recent developments have 
reduced the present significance of visit at sea almost to a vanishing point, and continue to 
insist upon form?l boarding and visit as a requirement for diversion. Thus Erik Castren (op. 
cit., pp. 357-8) expresses the rather anomalous view that "a merchant ship may not ~e diverted 
from its route except for good reasons. In practice this would mean that at least some kind of 
cur<;ory visitation must be made at the actual place of meeting unless the merchant ship flies 
the flag of the enemy or the warship has ascertained its enemy character in some other way." 
But why does "cursory visitation" constitute a "good reason" for diversion unless good reas~ms 
are conceived in the retention of procedures that no longer serve a substantive purpose. 
29 It should be clear from the statements above, that there is no intent to argue on belralf 
of the desirability of two sets of rules for neutral shipping-one governing the action of war-
ships and the other governing the action of aircraft. On the contrary, the rules governing 
warships are also applicable to aircraft. But the essential point is that the denial of the right 
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To date, it can hardly be said that the difficulties ensuing between neutral 
and belligerent as a consequence of diversion have been satisfactorily 
resolved. The belligerent's claim that the functions formerly served by 
the traditional procedure of visit and search at sea would be rendered 
almost wholly ineffective under modern conditions without a right to 
compel diversion has been met by the neutral's claim that the inconvenience 
and loss caused to legitimate neutral shipping through lengthy delay in 
contraband control bases represents an unreasonable-if not an unlawful-
hardship. 30 It has already been noted 31 that in practice this conflict was 
partially resolved by the introduction of a system of passes which enabled 
neutral vessels-upon approval by the belligerent-to avoid diversion into 
port for search. Neutral vessels have also been able to avoid a period of 
delay in port by giving prior assurance to a belligerent that upon reaching 
a neutral destination the cargo would be held until the belligerent's repre-
sentatives could examine and pass upon it.32 But whatever the precise 
nature of the arrangement the essential purpose has been to shift the pro-
of diversion to aircraft) merely because the latter cannot conduct visit, makes very little sense 
when visit itself is a mere formality precedent to diversion, or-as the events of World War II 
indicate-simply omitted altogether by belligerent warships. It is true that the jurists which 
met at The Hague in 192.3 were unable to agree upon whether aircraft should have a right to 
divert merchant vessels without prior visit or search or whether they should be required to 
board "'sur place before ordering diversion. The American delegation argued that although 
diversion might be "exceptionally" permitted to surface ships, "a similar concession to air-
craft, with their limited means of boarding, would readily have the effect of converting the 
exception into the rule." General Report, Commission of Jurists on 192.3 Rules of Aerial 
Warfare, U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, I(j24, p. 138. .But the present 
relevance of this argument must be questioned, since the exception has already been turned 
into the general rule in the case of surface ships. Nevertheless, most writers continue to 
insist that if aircraft cannot undertake the visit of neutral merchant vessels at the place of 
encounter they may not order their diversion. Even H. A. Smith (op. cit., pp. 166-8), who 
points our that under modern conditions boarding has largely become "an idle formality," 
observes that unless an aircraft "is capable of alighting on the water, the visit must obviously 
be carried out by a warship, which must therefore be within reasonable distance of the ship 
visited." And this supposedly for the reason that "aircraft in flight can only assist naval 
forces in exercising the right of visit and search, a right which by its nature can only be exer-
cised by ships of war.'' 
30 It seems quite clear that the real bone of contention between Great Britain and neutral 
states during the fall of 1939 and the early months of 1940 did not primarily concern the legality 
as such of diversion, but rather the losses incurred by neutral traders through lengthy delays in 
contraband control bases. To alleviate this situation Great Britain sought to shorten the 
period in port and to bring into operation as quickly as possible the navicert system, whereby 
diversion into port might be avoided altogether. . 
31 See pp. 2.8o-2.. 
32 Known variously as "black-diamond" and "hold-back" guarantees, Medlicott (op. cit., 
p. 87) writes that the "essential feature of the 'hold-back' system was that in certain circum-
stances a ship might be allowed to proceed to a neutral destination after giving a guarantee 
not to deliver to the consignees any cargo which was still under consideration by the Contra· 
band Committee, and to return to an Allied port any items of cargo which the committee had 
decided should be seized.'' 
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cedure of search from the high seas and belligerent ports to neutral territory, 
and has necessitated the voluntary cooperation both of neutral states and 
of private neutral traders. Quite apart from the tentative character of 
such arrangements, it is not easy to see how-from the viewpoint of the 
traditional law-either the neutral state or the neutral trader can acquiesce 
without raising serious questions. The neutral state in permitting a 
belligerent to inspect cargoes within its territory thereby renders a definite 
form of assistance to the belligerent. The neutral trader by actively 
participating in a system that eases the belligerent's task of contraband 
control risks the charge of performing· an unneutral service. 33 Yet the 
alternative in both World Wars has been either enforced diversion, attended 
by costly delays, or belligerent ''reprisal" measures, whose effect has been to 
render compulsory that action on the part of neutrals previous! y elicited 
on a voluntary basis. 34 
B. SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL VESSELS 
It is of importance to distinguish as clearly as possible between the formal 
act of seizing or capturing 35 a neutral vessel and acts which, though ap-
parently resembling seizure, nevertheless must receive a quite different 
interpretation. In particular, a clear distinction should be drawn between 
33 See pp. 32.2.-3. 
34 See pp. 313-5. Small satisfaction can be derived in terminating a discussion of visit and 
search on so uncertain a note. Little more can be said, however, while remaining within 
the confines imposed by a legal analysis. It may be argued that even though a right of 
diversion must now be accorded belligerents the scope of this right remains unsettled. From 
this point of view, at least some of the belligerent measures taken in the two World \Vars have 
yet to be recognized as the lawful consequences of the right of diversion. There is no real in-
compatibility between this position and the tentative conclusions that have been reached here. 
In either case, the precise limits of the right of diversion remain unsettled. Finally, it may be , 
relevant to observe that the controversies attending recent developments in the belligerent 
right of visit and search will not be resolved short of a clear change in the largely obsolescent 
distinction between neutral state and neutral trader, and the imposition upon neutral states of 
the duty to insure that their subjects refrain from acts which they themselves have long been 
obligated to abstain from performing. And for the proposal that neutral states issue certifi-
cates covering cargoes carried on board ships of their nationality, see Harvard Draft Convention 
on Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 487-530. 
35 Mention has already been made (see p. 105 (n)) of the possible ambiguity that may 
result from the indiscriminate use of the terms "capture" and "seizure" when applied to the 
act of asserting control over enemy vessels. In part, these earlier observations are also appli-
cable to the present discussion. However, in the case of enemy vessels the need is to distinguish 
between those vessels (e. g., warships) which-in order that legal ownership may be trans-
ferred-do not require condemnation by a court of prize, and vessels (e. g., privately owned 
enemy merchant vessels) which require such condemnation before transfer of title can be effected. 
The same holds true with respect to enemy owned cargo found on board enemy vessels .. In 
the case of neutral vessels the need is to distinguish between the act of taking control in order 
that a prize court may determine whether the vessel or cargo, or both, is liable to condemnation, 
and the act of taking control in order to determine through further search whether sufficient 
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the seizure of a neutral vessel and her detention by a belligerent in order 
hat search may be carried out in port. In either case the belligerent may 
exercise very nearly the same degree of control over the neutral vessel and 
subject her to sin1ilar measures of compulsion in the event his orders are 
not followed 36 In addition, the belligerent's prize courts may assert the 
right to entertain neutral claims entered against the captor for compulsory 
diversion and detention in port without sufficient cause in the same manner 
as they may entertain neutral claims for compensation as a result of unlaw-
ful seizure. 37 
In view of the apparent similarities between acts constituting seizure (or 
capture) and acts amounting to no more than diversion into port for search, 
it would appear that seizure must be distinguished primarily by the intent 
of the belligerent. Such intent may be manifested not only by the fact 
that the belligerent has succeeded in imposing his wil1 upon the neutral 
vessel, thereby compelling her to abide by his orders, but also by the fact 
that he has done so because he is in possession of evidence which appears 
cause exists to charge vessel or cargo as liable to condemnation before a court of prize. The 
terms "seizure" and "capture" may be-and are-applied to the former act, though it must 
be made clear that the control exercised is merely provisional until the prize court has finally 
adjudicated upon the seizure. Furthermore, in either case (i. e., whether seized (captured) 
or merely diverted into port for search) the vessel is ''detained,'' though the legal significance of 
detention differs according to the intent of the belligerent. 
36 In seizing-or capturing-a neutral vessel the belligerent may place a prize crew on board, 
whereas in merely diverting the vessel into port for search he may place on board an "armed 
guard" to insure his orders are carried out. In both cases, however, the belligerent may simply 
order the neutral vessel to proceed into port under escort of a belligerent warship, or military 
aircraft. A neutral vessel under diversion that resists the orders given her by the escorting 
belligerent not only becomes immediately subject to seizure but to the use of forcible measures 
on the part of the belligerent. 
37 At least this seems to be the case in British prize law, though the practice in the prize 
courts of many continental countries has been to refuse to assert jurisdiction over, or take legal 
cognizance of, acts committed by the belligerent prior to formal seizure as prize (and particularly 
if such acts as diversion do not later result in a formal seizure or capture). A degree of uncer-
tainty still prevails, however, as to the precise status in British prize law of a vessel that has 
been detained for search in port. Normally, the act of diversion must be interpreted simply as 
a prolongation of the act of visit and search; the diverted vessel is under detention in the same 
sense as a vessel being visited and searched at sea. In The Netherlands American Steam Navigation 
Co. v. H. M. Procurator-General [192.6]-(1, Kings Bench, pp. 93-5; cited in Hackworth, Vol. VII, 
pp. 187-8), the Court of Appeal held that the placing of an armed guard on a neutral vessel and 
her compulsory diversion to a British port amounted to seizure, or capture, and thus gave the 
Prize Court authority to entertain a claim for compensation-whether on the ground that 
the compulsory diversion and detention was itself unjustified, or on the ground that the captor 
was negligent in insuring proper care of the vessel and cargo, or was unduly dilatory in carrying 
out the search. But in The Mim (cited above, p. 342. (n)) the Prize Court cast some doubt 
on the use of the term "seizure" (or capture) as applied to cases of diversion, and was content to 
declare that "the question is whether the act of the Crown was wrongful or nor." The main 
point is that the British system does permit judicial review by the Prize Court of allegedly 
wrongful acts of the captor in cases of compulsory diversion, although it must be added that 
to date the "protection" thus afforded neutrals has proven to be largely of formal significance. 
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to him as probable cause for condemnation of vessel or cargo by a court of 
prize. 38 
At the same time, seizure need not lead to the condemnation of the vessel 
or of her cargo. The lawfulness of the act of seizure is not dependent upon 
later condemnation by a prize court. It may well be that the circumstances 
held to justify seizure will not be regarded by a prize court as sufficient to 
justify condemnation. It may even be that later information brought to 
the attention of a belligerent prompts him voluntarily to release a vessel 
that earlier had been seized as prize. Nevertheless, the captor may not be 
made liable to claims for costs and damages-as would follow upon an 
unlavvful seizure-if he can establish that at the moment of seizure circum-
stances were such as to warrant suspicion of enemy character, whether of 
vessel or of cargo, or of the performance of acts held to constitute contra-
band carriage, blockade breach, or unneutral service. 39 
38 As in the case of enemy merchant vessels (see pp. 103-4) so in the case of neutral vessels 
capture is, as Colombos (op. cit., p. 305) points out, "the act whereby a belligerent warship 
compels a vessel to conform to her will." But a neutral vessel may be compelled to conform 
to the will of the captor for more purposes than one. Effective control takes on the meaning 
of a capture or seizure when the intent is to seek adjudication of vessel or cargo before a court 
of prize. See, in this respect, the remarks of Hyde, op. cit., pp. 202.1-3. It may also be noted 
that when a neutral vessel is undergoing diversion she may not be required to lower her flag, 
since she has not been captured. See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 5o2b (5). Seizure or capture 
does indicate that the vessel is for the time in the possession of the captor, and the latter may 
require the neutral vessel to lower her flag, or-if the neutral flag is flown as usual-the flag of 
the captor may be exhibited at the fore. 
39 See Law of Naval Warfa~·e, Article 502b (7) and-for an enumeration of acts justifying 
seizure or capture of neutral vessels-Article 5o3d. Indeed, any of the various acts a neutral 
vessel may resort to in order to frustrate visit and search-reviewed in the preceding section 
of this chapter-give rise to a right of seizure. Of course, the real problem arises where the 
neutral vessel has not attempted to resist or frustrate the belligerent and where her papers 
(and cargo) do not indicate that she is evidently engaged in contraband c2rriage, blockade 
breach, or the performance of unneutral service. The Supreme Court of the United States (sitting ' 
in prize) has defined "probable cause"-sufficient to justify seizure-as existing "where there 
are circumstances sufficient to warrant suspicion, though it may turn out chat the facts are not 
sufficient to justify condemnation. And whether they are or not can not be determined unless 
the customary proceedings of prize are instituted and enforced." Olinde Rodriguez [1899], 174 
U.S. 510. But although "probable cause" depends upon the existence of circumstances deemed 
sufficient to "warrant suspicion," the question remains unanswered as to the nature and extent 
of the circumstances required in a given period to warrant suspicion-and hence to justify 
seizure. The practical importance of this question can hardly be overstated since a belligerent 
may well accomplish his purpose of cutting off all supplies to an enemy merely through seizure, 
and quite without the necessity of obtaining condemnation by a prize court. In this respect, 
the actual significance of seizure has undergone far-reaching change since the nineteenth century. 
During this earlier period the failure of a belligerent to obtain the condemnation of cargo seized 
as prize normally meant that che neutral owner was at liberty to re-ship his goods. This being 
so, the belligerent had no assurance that goods released by a prize court would not ultimately 
reach an enemy. Today, however, the belligerent need not suffer under any such apprehension, 
so long as he is able to justify his original act of seizure. One reason for this is the power of 
prize courts either directly to dispose of goods held in prize (e. g., because of perishability or 
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In seizing neutral vessels the belligerent incurs certain duties that have 
long enjoyed the sanction of state practice. Unless the neutral nationals 
serving as officers and crew of neutral vessels have taken a direct part in the 
hostilities they may not be treated as prisoners of war. 40 Nor is there any 
justification for placing the personnel of neutral prizes under any special 
restraint, unless this is shown to be necessary for the security of the prize 
crew. The captor may request the master and crew to assist him in navi-
gating the prize into port, though he cannot compel them to render any 
assistance. And if not temporarily detained as witne·sses in prize court pro-
ceedings the personnel of neutral prizes must be released at the earliest 
possible time by the belligerent undertaking capture. 
The duties imposed upon the captor with respect to the seized neutral 
property follow largely from the fact that the seizure of neutral vessels and 
cargo does no~ serve to effect transfer of title in favor of the captor, but only 
places him in temporary possession of the property. The determination of 
title remains the sole responsibility of the prize court, which is charged 
the shortage of storage space) or to authorize their requisition in response to a request by the 
executive that they are urgently needed for the national defense (seep. 348 (n)). In either event 
the neutral owner must receive compensation, but the belligerent has achieved his principal 
aim of preventing the goods from ever falling into enemy hands. Even if goods that have been 
lawfully seized are finally released-whether through failure by the belligerent to obtain con-
demnation or merely through the prize court ordering release with the executive's consent-
the neutral owner may find himself unable to remove them from the belligerent's jurisdiction. 
Thus, in examining modern British practice of contraband control Fitzmaurice (op. cit., p. 75) 
points out that:' 'The decision rendered in 192.1 by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in the case of The Falk ... established the principle that an order for the release of 
goods seized in Prize only operates to place the owner of the goods in possession of them in 
this country and does not of itself entitle him to remove them from the realm .... In fact, 
the position which appears to result from this decision is that goods seized in Prize (as opposed 
to those merely detained pending investigation) are deemed to have actually entered the country 
and, on release from Prize, automatically fall under the general legislation governing the export 
or removal of goods from the country and can therefore only be exported or removed by com-
plying with the requirements of this legislation.'' Fitzmaurice further observes that the drop 
in the activity of the Prize Court during the 1939 war was due to this "shift in emphasis as 
between the condemnation of goods and their initial seizure." MedJicott (op. cit., p. 84), in 
surveying these same developments, declares that: ''The practical effect of seizure in perhaps 
the majority of cases was ... that, whether condemned or released, they would never reach 
the country to which they were originally destined.'' Even this cursory review should prove 
sufficient to indicate the importance of the nature and scope of the circumstances held to ''war-
rant suspicion," and to justify seizure. If the consistent practice of belligerents during the 
two World Wars is to be regarded as law-making in character these circumstances are now such 
as almost to preclude successful neutral claims for damages arising from unlawful seizures-
save in the most flagrant instances. Colombos (op. cit., p. 309), writing of the 1914 and 1939 
conflicts, states that: ''The cases where a Prize Court has taken the view that no 'circumstances 
of suspicion' could be invoked by the captor in justification of the seizure are extremely few." 
And for a brief survey of the principal circt:mstances held w give rise to a presumption of contra-
band carriage, see pp. 2.72.-5. 
40 .See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 513· As to the disposition of enemy nationals found on 
board neutral vessels, see pp. 32.5-30. 
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with the task of investigating the circumstances attending seizure and de-
ciding whether or not there is sufficient cause for confiscating vessel or 
cargo-or bor.:h. In consequence of his purely provisional possession the 
captor must take reasonable measures to preserve the vessel (and cargo) 
intact and to take her into the nearest convenient port without undue delay, 
there to be turned over to the custody of officers of the prize court.41 
41 On the procedure to be followed by United States naval forces when sending neutral prizes 
in for adjudication, see the references given on p. 106 (n). A special problem arises should 
the captor desire to requisition seized neutral vessels or cargoes for his public use prior to final 
adjudication of the seizure by a court of prize. In British prize law the right of a belligerent 
to requisition vessels or goods in the custody of its prize court, pending adjudication, was 
upheld by the Judilial Committee of the Privy Council in The Zamora [1916]-(4 Lloyds Priz.e 
Cases, p. 108), though subject to the following limitations: 
"First, the vessel or goods in question must be urgently required for use in connection with 
the defense of the realm, the prosecution of the war, or other matters involving national se-
curity. Secondly, there must be a real question to be tried, so that it would be improper to 
order an immediate release. And, thirdly, the right must be enforced by application to the 
prize court, which must determine judicially whether, under the particular circumstances of 
the case, the right is exercisable." 
Fitzmaurice (op. cit., p. 81) observes that the justification for requisitioning is "(a) that it 
would be unreasonable that goods ... urgently required for national use, should have to be 
kept in specie to await the outcome of the proceedings, and (b) that the rights of the claimant 
are not prejudiced since, if an order for release is made in his favor, he will obtain, if not the 
goods themselves, their value." Since the word of the Crown is conclusive in testifying that 
the vessel or goods in question are urgently required, the function of the Prize Court-according 
to The Zamora-is to insure that there is a "real case for investigation and trial, and that the 
circumstances are not such as would justify the immediate release of the vessel or goods.'' 
Hence the purpose of requiring application to the Prize Court is to prevent the requisitioning of 
neutral vessels or goods simply for the reason that the Crown desires their use, but against 
which there is no real case. In this respect, British practice would appear to offer greater • protection to neutrals than does the practice of other states. For while the right of a belligerent 
government to requisition seized neutral vessels and cargoes, pending adjudication, is now 
generally recognized, similar limitations upon its exercise are not imposed by the prize courts 
of other countries. The Prize Statutes of the United States have long permitted the requisition ' 
of seized vessels and goods, whether hefore or after such property comes into the custody of the 
prize courts (U.S. Code, Title 34, Sections II4o-41; also the 1942. Prize Act, 56 Stat. 746 (1942.), 
which broadened the procedure whereby the United States can make immediate use of a captured 
vessel, without awaiting the institution of prize proceedings and without applying to the prize 
court for requisition). In all cases of requisitioning the government department for whose 
use the vessels or goods are taken "shall deposit the value thereof with the Treasurer of the 
United States or public depository nearest to the place of the session of the court, subject to the 
order of the court in the cause" (34 U. S. C. II4o). This procedure has always been regarded 
as of an exceptional nature, however, and to be resorted to only under compelling circum-
stances, since indemnification must follow if the prize court fails to condemn the neutral property , 
converted to public use (see 1917 Instructions, paragraph 85; 1941 Instructions, paragraph 89; 
Law of Naval Warfare, Chapter 5, note 16). 
The requisitioning of seized neutral vessels or goods brought into belligerent territory ~ay 
be regarded as forming a special aspect of the more general right of belligerents to requisition 
any neutral property found within their jurisdiction. Normally, such property will be present 
voluntarily in belligerent territory, and the objections that are still occasionally voiced against 
the requisition of neutral prize, pending adjudication, arises mainly from the face that this 
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As in the case of enemy prizes, however, occasions may frequently arise 
when the sending in of neutral prizes proves either impossible or highly 
inconvenient to the captor. Under these circumstances the customary 
practice of states has always drawn a distinction between the destruction 
of enemy prizes and the destruction of neutral prizes. Whereas belligerents 
admittedly enjoy a broad discretion in resorting to the destruction of enemy 
prizes the circumstances in which neutral prizes may be destroyed are con-
siderably more restrictive. Indeed, during the nineteenth century there 
was substantial support for the position that if for any reason a captured 
neutral vessel could not be taken into port for adjudication the captor was 
obliged to release her, and that if instead he resorted to the destruction of 
a neutral prize the owners of the vessel and cargo were always entitled to 
receive full compensation. 42 This opinion still finds some support even 
today. 43 
property has been forcibly brought into belligerent territory. With respect to neutral property 
voluntarily present (even though such presence is only temporary), requisition by the belligerent 
is frequently based upon a "right of angary," though it has been observed that "in reality 
little distinction is drawn in principle between the exercise of the power of eminent domain 
or expropriation for public use in time of peace, and requisitions in time of war, including 
requisitions of vessels or cargoes, in spite of this latter practice being sometimes based on a 
distinct 'right of angary'. In all these cases, the practice is based on the right of the sovereign 
to control property within his jurisdiction.'' Harvard Draft Convmtion on Rights and Duties 
of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 384-5· But see Lauterpacht, "Angary and 
Requisitions of Neutral Property" (B. Y. I. L., 2.7 (1950), pp. 455-9), who contends that 
"requisition" applies to neutral property "permanently and voluntarily residing" in bellig-
erent territory-and requires only "reasonable compensation"-and that "angary" applies to 
neutral property brought to belligerent territory either "without the neutral's consent or ... 
brought there for purely temporary purposes"-and requires "full compensation." And see, 
generally, C. L. Bullock, "Angary," B. Y. I. L.; (192.2.-2.3), pp. 99-12.9; J. E. Harley, "The 
Law of Angary," A. ]. I. L., 13 (1919), pp. 2.67-301; U. S. Naval War College, International 
Law Situations, I926, pp. 65-87; Hackworth, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 638-55; and Hyde, op. cit., pp. 
q6o-9. On the requisitioning of Dutch merchant vessels by the United States and Great 
Britain in 1918, see G. G. Wilson, "Taking Over and Return of Dutch Vessels, 1918-1919,'' 
A.]. 1. L., 2.4 (1930), PP· 694102.. 
42 A review of nineteenth century practice and opinion is given in Harvard Draft Convention on 
Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, op. cit., pp. 559-75· The traditional 
British position, in particular, inclined very strongly toward release if neutral prizes could not 
be sent in, and compensation to the owners of vessel and cargo in the event of destruction. 
It bas been pointed out on more than one occasion that the traditional British position was 
strongly influenced by the numerous bases maintained by Great Britain throughout the world. 
However that may be, even the British view seems to have allowed that in certain exceptional 
cases, involving unneutral service and blockade running, destruction might be permitted if 
absolutely necessary. No other major maritime power took so consistent and so strong a 
position against the destruction of neutral vessels. 
43 E. g. Colombos (op. cit., p. 303) declares that: "The destruction of neutral ships must, as 
a rule, be altogether prohibited. If the captor is unable to bring a neutral vessel into port for 
adjudication, he must release her. Reasons of urgent military necessity or other exceptional 
circumstances are strictly excluded." Nevertheless, Colombos does make exception for un-
neutral service or blockade running. 
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It would be difficult to assert, however, that the traditional law prior to 
1914 strictly forbade the destruction of neutral prizes. In fact, a number 
of maritime powers had never accepted the rule that would have denied 
to them, as belligerents, the right to destroy under any circumstances 
captured neutral vessels engaged in the supply of war material to an enemy. 44 
In the provisions of the Declaration of London the attempt was made to 
clarify the problem and to resolve the diverse attitudes of states. Although 
declaring that-in principle-a captured neutral vessel was not to be de-
stroyed by the captor, but instead must be taken into port for adjudication,45 
it was nevertheless provided that exceptionally a neutral prize-otherwise 
liable to condemnation-could be destroyed if taking her into port'' would 
involve danger to the ship of war or to the success of the operation in 
which she is at the time engaged." 46 Before destroying the neutral prize 
all persons on board were to be removed to a place of safety and all ship's 
papers and other relevant documents were to be taken on board the bellig-
erent warship. 47 If the captor who destroyed a neutral vessel could not 
establish to the satisfaction of a prize court that he acted only in the face 
of ''exceptional necessity'' the interested parties would be entitled to receive 
compensation, without regard to whether or not the capture itself was 
valid. 48 Finally, even though the captor might show that he resorted to 
the destruction of a captured neutral vessel only in the face of an exceptional 
necessity, the interested parties would remain entitled to compensation if 
44 It is true that prior to the Russo-Japanese War, at the beginning of this century, there had 
been very few incidents involving the destruction of neutral vessels. But during that conflict 
Russian naval forces did sink an appreciable number of neutral vessels. Despite British pro-
tests that the sinkings were unlawful the Russian Government refused to render any compen-
sation to the owners of vessels her prize courts later found to have been liable to condemnation. 
It is also relevant to note that Article so of the U.S. Naval War Code of 1900 declared: 
"H there are controlling reasons why vessels that are properly captured may not be sent in 
for adjudication-such as unseaworthiness, the existence of infectious disease, or the lack of a ' 
prize crew-they may be appraised and sold, and if this can not be done, they may be destroyed. 
The imminent danger of recapture would justify destruction, if there should be no doubt that 
the vessel was a proper prize. But in all such cases all of the papers and other testimony should 
be sent to the prize court, in order that a decree may be duly entered." 
A substantially similar order was given to American naval forces during the Spanish-American 
\Var. Yet in 19os the Naval War College concluded-in a review of the question-''that if a 
seized neutral vessel cannot for any reason be brought into port for adjudication, it should be 
dismissed. •• International Law Topics, 1905, p. 62.. In a still later study it was contended that 
although "the treatment of neutral vessels in time of war is not yet a fully settled question," 
nevertheless, "destruction, on account of military necessity, of a neutral vessel guilty only of 
the carriage of contraband entitles the owner to fullest compensation. Before destruction all 
persons and papers should be placed in safety." International Law ·situations, 1907, pp. 107:-8. 
45 Article 48. 
46 Article 49· 
47 Article so. It is interesting to note that no further definition was given as to what would 
constitute "a place of safety." 
48 The "exceptional necessity" is a reference to the conditions earlier cited in Article 49· 
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it were subsequently shown that no adequate grounds existed for condemn-
ing the destroyed property. 49 
Although never ratified, these provisions of the Declaration of London 
indicate that in the years immediately prior to World War I most of the 
major maritime powers were willing to concede that under certain circum-
stances the destruction of captured neutral vessels-otherwise liable to con-
demnation-was not unlawful, and, if resorted to, ought not to give rise 
to an obligation of compensating the owners of the destroyed property. 
At the same time, the Declaration can hardly be regarded as clarifying the 
nature of the situations in which destruction was to be permitted. Instead, 
the formula provided was sufficiently vague to allow belligerents any num-
ber of possible interpretations, as the later events of World War I clearly 
demonstrated. 50 
49 Article 52. The compensation Article 52 would have required was evidently intended 
to be applicable despite the fact that the captor could show "probable cause" for capture. The 
"validity" of the capture referred to the later condemnation by a prize court, and if such con-
demnation did not follow compensation had to be given. Article 53 declared that: .. If neutral 
goods which were not liable to condemnation have been destroyed with the vessel, the owner 
of such goods is entitled to compensation." And Article 54 allowed the captor the right "to 
require the giving up of, or to proceed to destroy, goods liable to condemnation found on board 
a vessel which herself is not liable to condemnation, provided that the circumstances are such 
as, according to Article 49, justify the destruction of a vessel liable to condemnation.'' 
50 The possible interpretations of Article 49 of the Declaration of London offered belligerents 
a latitude in destroying captured neutral vessels that was not too dissimilar from rhe license 
granted in the destruction of enemy prizes (the only substantial check being the obligation to 
compensate if a prize court later found that adequate ground for condemnation did not exist). 
It may of course be argued that this possible latitude opened to belligerents was not the intent 
of the drafters. If so, the true intent was hardly realized in the wording of Article 49, since 
it would be difficult to find a much broader formula. Nor is this conclusion altered by the 
fact that Article 51 required destruction only ''in the face of an exceptional necessity''-a phrase 
broadly synonymous with "military necessity." For these reasons, it is difficult to accept the 
opinion that according to Article 49 of the Declaration "a neutral prize might no longer be 
destroyed because the captor could not spare a prize crew, or because a port of a Prize Court 
was too far distant, or the like." Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, op. cit., p. 864. 
Although rhe Allied Powers refrained during World War I from pursuing a policy of destroy-
ing captured neutral vessels, it can not be maintained that this policy was expressive of estab-
lished law. For a review of the relevant provisions of the German and Italian prize regulations 
during the two wars-which did permit destruction in a number of circumstances-see Hack-
worth, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 256-8. Paragraph 96 of the 1917 Instructions issued to U. S. naval 
forces declared that unless a neutral prize had engaged in a form of unneutral service, which 
stamped it with enemy character, it "mustnotbedestroyed by the capturing officer save in case 
of the greatest military emergency which would not justify him in releasing the vessel or send-
ing it in for adjudication." A substantially similar provision was made in paragraph ror of 
the 1941 Instructions. And see the review of practice and opinion presented in U. S. Naval War 
College, International Law Doettments, 1943 (pp. 38-so) where the conclusion is drawn that: 
"Although there has still been some discussion since the World War as to whether or not a 
neutral prize should be destroyed, practice and documents indicate that the destruction of 
neutral vessels and aircraft captured as prizes may be destroyed only if warranted by the 
extreme seriousness of the military situation and by the utter impracticability of bringing the 
prize in for adjudication. In the case of destruction, passengers (if possible, their personal 
effects also), the crew, and the craft's papers must be placed in safety." 
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As n1atters presently stand it does not appear possible to define with any 
real precision the circwnstances in which neutral prizes lawfully may be 
destroyed. 51 Undoubtedly it remains true, however, that the destruction 
of neutral prizes involves a much more serious responsibility for a belliger-
ent, as well as for a belligerent commander, than does the destruction of an 
enemy prize. If it is later found that either the vessel or the cargo was not 
liable to conden1nation indemnification of the innocent property must be 
made. For this reason, among others, the destruction of neutral prizes 
ought to be avoided whenever possible. 
If destruction is nevertheless resorted to the captor is obliged-prior to 
the act of destruction-to provide for the safety of passengers and crevv, and 
to insure that all documents and papers relating to the neutral prize are 
removed and saved in order that a prize court may later adjudicate upon the 
validity of the capture. These duties of the captor have long formed a 
part of the customary law, though the latter was not entirely clear as to 
what could be reasonably interpreted as a place of safety for passengers and 
crew. This point was clarified in Article 2.2 of the London Naval Treaty 
of 1930, 52 and in the subsequent London Protocol of 1936, which, in re-
affirming the customary la-v1 as valid for both surface vessels and submarines, 
declared that ''the ships boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless 
the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and 
weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another 
vessel which is in a position to take them on board." 
In an earlier chapter some of the measures resorted to by belligerents-
and particularly by Germany-in the attempt to evade these restrictions 
have been reviewed and analyzed. 53 At that time it was submitted that 
despite the persistence of these belligerent measures during the two World 
Wars there is still no substantial warrant for asserting that the traditional 
law has lost its validity. 54 If so, this 1nust mean that apart from certain 
51 "Neutral prizes," let it be noted, and not neutral vessels undergoing detention for search 
in ports. Destruction of the latter, save in the case of forcible resistance, is in any event 
forbidden. 
52 See p. 63 for text of Article 2.2.. 
53 See pp. 2.96-305. 
54 Although this conclusion may admittedly prove of little comfort in any future conflict 
attended by the conditions that characterized the two World Wars. Nevertheless, this con-
sideration can not be regarded as sufficient reason for asserting that the rule forbidding the 
destruction of neutral vessels, without first resorting to seizure and removing passengers and 
crew to a place of safety, is no longer binding. Whatever the possible justification that may be 
urged on behalf of unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare agait:st enemy merchant vessels 
(see pp. 67-70), there is no similar case to be made for the destruction of neutral vessels without 
complying with the obligation laid down by the traditional law, save perhaps the extravag'!-nt 
belligerent claim that the economic isolation of an enemy justifies the destruction of neutral 
shipping intended for the enemy, whatever the means employed. It is this latt'er point that 
Professor Stone (op. cit., p. 6o4) places emphasis upon, when he observes-in a stimulating and 
perceptive analysis of recent developments-that "the traditional distinction, for purposes oJ 
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limited exceptions- persistent refusal to stop upon being duly summoned, 
any form of forcible resistance to visit and search, taking a direct part in 
the hostilities on the side of an enemy 55-a belligerent may not proceed to 
the destruction of neutral vessels without having first captured them and 
removed passengers and crew, as well as ship's papers, to;a place of safety. 56 
Nor does the inability of submarines or aircraft to comply with these obli-
the right of capture and destruction, between goods carried in enemy and neutral bottoms has 
only a faded meaning when the acknowledged objective is 'annihilation of the enemy com-
merce.' " But there are methods and methods for accomplishing this "acknowledged objec-
tive," in itself not unlawful. To argue, however, that this objective must determine the rules 
that are to regulate belligerent conduct toward neutral shipping is to reduce this law to a 
mere simulacrum. No doubt there is a very large grain of truth in Professor Stone's criticism 
that: "Anglo-American publicists have regarded air and submarine craft as interlopers in naval 
warfare, which must play the game according to surface rules, or not at all, with no ground 
of complaint if the rules forbid their effective use." At the same time, it is one thing to insist 
upon a rigid observance by submarines and aircraft of rules whose denial does not involve the 
taking of neutral lives (e. g., diversion prior to visitation), and quite another thing to insist 
upon submarines and aircraft observing rules whose denial does involve the taking of neutral 
lives. There is little warrant for the rather deceptive categorization of the latter as merely 
part of the "game according to surface rules." 
55 To the acts enumerated above may be added the special control a belligerent may exert 
within an immediate area of naval operations (see pp. 3oo-1). The failure of a neutral vessel 
to conform to the special regulations established by a belligerent within this restricted area, 
and even to avoid it altogether, may well give rise to a liability to being fired upon. But even 
in those circumstances where a belligerent is permitted to fire upon, and possibly to destroy; 
a neutral vessel, without first seizing her and removing passengers and crew to a place of safety, 
the obligation remains to take all possible measures to search for and to rescue survivors. 
Insofar as the so-called "Laconia Order" (see pp. 72.-3) was intended to apply to both enemy and 
neutral merchant vessels its unlawful character is patent. 
56 See Law of Naval Warfare, Article 503c.-In this connection it may be relevant to cite a 
rather curious-and obscure-passage in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal 
dealing with Admiral Doenitz. After condemning the establishment of operational zones 
within which neutral vessels were sunk without warning by submarines, and declaring that 
the contents of the "Laconia Order" (see pp. 72.-3) "were undoubtedly ambiguous and deserve 
the strongest censure," the Tribunal went on to declare: 
"The evidence further shows that the rescue provisions were not carried out and that the 
defendant ordered that they should not be carried out. The argument of the defense is that the 
security of the submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that the develop-
ment of aircraft made rescue impossible. This may be so, but the protocol [i.e., the 1936 London 
Protocol] is explicit. If the commander cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a 
merchant vessel and should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope. These orders, then, 
prove Doenitz is guilty of a violation of the protocol." For text of judgment, U.S. Naval War 
College, International Law Documents, I946-47, pp. 30o-1. 
The statement is confusing in that it appears to imply that so long as the submarine can and 
will rescue survivors, neutral merchant vessels may be sunk without warning. But the rule to 
which the Tribunal had reference clearly obligates belligerents not to "sink or render incapable 
of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship's papers 
in a place of safety." Thus, under the 1936 London Protocol the problem of rescue does not 
even arise, since belligerents are under the obligation to capture the neutral vessel before resort-
·ng to its destruccion (exception being made for those circumstances enumerated above). 
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gations serve to confer upon them any right to depart from the rules hereto-
fore applicable-and still applicable-to surface vessels. 
C. VISIT, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF NEUTRAL 
o AIRCRAFT 
In preceding pages 57 attention has been directed to some of the difficulties 
involved in the assumption that the rules regulating seizure and destruction 
of enemy vessels may be applied by analogy to the treatment of enemy air-
craft. Similar difficulties are apparent in the further assumption that the 
position of neutral aircraft rna y be assimilated to the position of neutral 
vessels, the rules applicable to the latter being considered as generally 
applicable to neutral aircraft. 58 Here again-as in the case of enemy air-
craft-the practice of states through World War II is far too slight to pro-
vide sufficient basis for discerning the emergence of specific rules grounded 
in the behavior of belligerents and neutrals. In the absence of either con-
ventional regulation or of state practice that may be regarded as constitu-
tive of customary rules any discussion of the specific limits imposed upon 
belligerents in interfering with neutral aircraft necessarily must prove of 
limited utility. It is possible, hovvever, to indicate in broad outline the 
nature and scope of the measures permitted to belligerents. 59 
Undoubtedly, the various forms of assistance neutral aircraft may render 
belligerents justifies the latter in claiming the right to check the activities 
of neutral civil aircraft encountered anywhere outside of neutral jurisdic-
tion.60 Nor has there been any disposition to question the right of bellig-
erent military aircraft to require neutral civil aircraft to deviate from their 
57 See pp. 1o8-u. 
58 An assumption that formed the basis of the relevant provisions (Articles 49, 53-6) of the 
192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare. 
59 In part, the measures permitted to belligerents against neutral aircraft engaged in certain 
forms of unneutral service have already been indicated (see pp. 319 ff.). 
60 As in the case of warfare at sea, visit and search of neutral aircraft must be limited to 
aircraft formally commissioned in the armed forces of a belligerent. Less certain are the objects 
of the belligerent right of visit and search. Although it is generally assumed that this right 
extends to aircraft owned by the state, but operated for commercial purposes, the matter has 
yet to be resolved in practice. Even less certain is the right of a belligerent to capture and 
condemn neutral state-owned commercial aircraft found engaged in assisting a belligerent. 
The 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare assumed that the law of prize would apply not orily to pri-
vately owned aircraft but to publicly owned aircraft other than military aircraft and aircraft 
employed for customs or police purposes. The same assumption is reflected in Law of Naval 
Warfare, Section 5oob. On the other hand Rowson (op. cit., pp. 2.u-2.) points out that: "This 
assimilation of certain neutral public non-military aircraft to private aircraft • . • overlooks 
... that for a neutral state to permit its own commercial aircraft to engage in activities which 
would render them liable to condemnation if they were private property is a breach of neutrality 
against which a belligerent should be allowed to protect himself without reference to a prize 
court." 
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course to a suitable locality vvhere visit and search may be carried out. 61 At 
the same time, there is little indication of the procedure that is to be fol-
lowed in ordering the diversion of neutral aircraft or the measures available 
to a belligerent in the event a neutral aircraft is unable to undertake di-
version. 62 
It is clear that the substantive grounds justifying the capture of neutral 
aircraft are at least as broad as the rules justifying the capture of neutral 
vessels. 63 Thus neutral aircraft engaged in the carriage of contraband, 
breach of blockade (extended to the air), or the performance of unneutral 
service may be seized as prize. In principle, the duties incurred by a bellig-
erent in seizing neutral vessels would appear to be equally applicable when 
61 Article 50 of the 192.3 draft Rules permitted diversion for visit and search "to a suitable 
locality reasonably accessible." Failure to obey such orders would expose an aircraft to the 
risk of being fired upon. 
62 Of course, if a neutral aircraft attempts to·fleeupon being summoned, or offers any form of 
resistance to a belligerent military aircraft, then the latter is entitled to resort to force and 
even-if necessary-to destroy the neutral aircraft. The critical-and as yet unanswered-
question concerns the measures available to a belligerent if the neutral aircraft is unable to 
undertake diversion, e. g., because of want of sufficient fuel. Although this question was 
not specifically dealt with in the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare it is indirectly covered by the 
stipulation in Article 50 that neutral aircraft may be deviated only to a "suitable locality 
reasonably accessible." In the comment to Article 50 it is declared that: "It would be a 
hardship to the neutral if he was obliged to make a long journey for this purpose and the locality 
must, therefore, not only be suitable, but must be reasonably accessible-that is, reasonably 
convenient of access. A more precise definition than this can scarcely be given; what is reason-
ably convenient of access is a question of fact to be determined in each case in the light of the 
special circumstances which may be present. If no place can be found which is reasonably 
convenient of access, the aircraft should be allowed to ~ontinue its flight." General Report 
of The Commission of Jurists, cited in U. S. Naval War College, International Law Documents, 
192.4, p. 141. It is not difficult to conceive of circumstancefs in which the course of action advo· 
cated above would result in the belligerent surrendering-or practical purposes-his right to 
suppress neutral aircraft engaged in rendering assistance to an enemy. Nor is it to be expected 
that belligerents will readily acquiesce to this solution, particularly if future conflicts witness 
rapid developments in air transport. 
63 Indeed, this would appear as a very conservative assumption, and it is quite likely that 
future developments in this area of the law will see an extension (as compared with the mari-
time rules) of the grounds justifying capture. Even Article 53 of the 192.3 Rules of Aerial 
Warfare, although applying to neutral aircraft the rules already applicable to neurral merchant 
vessels, went beyond the latter rules in certain respects. Thus "neutral private aircraft" 
were held liable to capture not only for the carriage of contraband, breach of blockade and the 
performance of unneutral service, but also if "armed in time of war when outside the jurisdiction 
of its own country," or if found bearing no external marks or using false marks. Violation of 
a belligerent's prohibition against entering an area of operations-as defined in Article 3D-
constituted a further ground for capture.-And see Law of Naval Warfare, Article 503d for an 
enumeration of acts held to create a liability to capture if performed either by neutral vessels 
or aircraft.-Distinguish, however, between acts of neutral aircraft resulting in a liability to 
capture and acts which result not only in a liability to capture but to the destruction-if neces-
sary-of the aircraft prior to capture. Liability to destruction prior to capture may arise 
either from the attempt to evade or to resist the exercise of belligerent rights, or from the per· 
formance of several types of unneutral service. 
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capturing neutral aircraft. 64 Unless the neutral nationals serving as crew 
members have taken a direct part in the hostilities against the captor (or 
are found to be serving in the enemy's employ) they may not be made 
prisoners of war. With respect to the seized aircraft and cargo the captor 
is placed only in temporary possession pending adjudication of the capture 
by a court of prize. In consequence of his provisional possession reasonable 
measures must be taken to preserve the seized property intact and to turn 
it over to the custody of the officers of the prize court without undue delay. 
Finally, it does not appear that a captor is under any greater restriction in 
resorting to the destruction of neutral aircraft seized as prize than he is in 
resorting to the destruction of captured neutral vessels. 65 
64 See pp. 347-8. 
65 See pp. 349-53· Also Law of NavalWarfare, Article 503e.-It is of interest to note that 
Articles 58 and 59 of the 192.3 Rules of Aerial Warfare, concerning the destruction of captured 
neutral aircraft, were-if anything-more strict than the corresponding provisions of the Decla-
ration of London, dealing with the destruction of neutral vessels seized as prize. Article 58 
would have permitted the destruction of neutral aircraft seized for unneutral service, or for 
having no marks or bearing false marks, only when sending the aircraft in "would be impossible 
or would imperil the safety of the belligerent aircraft or the success of the operations in which 
it is engaged." Apart from these cases destruction was held to be justified only in the "gravest 
military emergency, which would not justify the officer in command in releasing it or sending 
it in for adjudication." In any case-according to Article 5yall persons on board an aircraft 
were to first be removed to a place of safety and the aircraft's papers preservtd. If the captor 
later failed to show sufficient cause for destruction the interested parties were to be entitled 
to compensation-even though the capture was held to be valid. Finally, if the capture 
was later held to be invalid, though the act of destruction held to have been justifiable, com-
pensation would also follow. 
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